This paper assesses empirically whether banking regulation is e¤ective at preventing banking crises. We use a monthly index of banking system fragility, which captures almost every source of risk in the banking system, to estimate the e¤ect of regulatory measures (entry restriction, reserve requirement, deposit insurance, and capital adequacy requirement) on banking stability in the context of a Markov-switching model. We apply this method to the Indonesian banking system, which has been subject to several regulatory changes over the last couple of decades, and at the same time, has experienced a severe systemic crisis. We draw from this research the following …ndings: (i) entry restriction reduces crisis duration and also the probability of their occurrence; (ii) larger reserve requirements reduce crisis duration, but increase banking instability; (iii) deposit insurance increases banking system stability and reduces crisis duration. (vi) capital adequacy requirement improves stability and reduces the expected duration of banking crises.
Introduction
Banks have always been viewed as fragile institutions that need government help to evolve in a safe and sound environment. Market failures such as incomplete markets, moral hazard between banks' owners and depositors, and negative externalities (like contagion) have been pointed out to explain this fragility. These have motivated government regulatory agencies or central banks to introduce several types of regulatory measures, such as entry barriers, reserve requirements, and capital adequacy requirements.
Generally, the theoretical e¤ect of any given regulation is mixed. For example, full deposit insurance helps the banking system to avoid bank panics (see, e.g., Diamond and Dybvig (1983) ). In fact, it provides insurance to depositors that they will in any case obtain their deposits. However, as all authors acknowledge, it increases the moral hazard issue in the banking industry. Therefore, the general equilibrium result of deposit insurance is not as straightforward as one would have thought (see, e.g., Matutes and Vives (1996) ). 1 For almost every type of regulation the general equilibrium result is not straightforward on theoretical grounds (see, e.g., Gale (2003, 2004) , Morrison and White (2005) ).
It follows then that the question of the e¤ectiveness of banking regulation is of …rst-order empirical importance.
A fair amount of empirical work has already been done on the impact of banking regulation on banking system stability. 2 Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004) assessed the impact of all available regulatory measures across the world on banking stability. More speci…cally, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detriagache (2002) focused on the e¤ect of deposit insurance on banking system stability, while Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2006) focused on the impact of banking concentration. All these studies use discrete regression models such as the logit model. Although this is an important attempt to test empirically the e¤ect of regulation on banking system stability, it presents some important limitations: a selection bias and a lack of assessment of the impact of these regulations on banking crisis duration.
The selection bias comes from the method used to build the banking crisis variable. In fact, available banking crisis indicators identify a crisis year using a combination of market events such as closures, mergers, runs on …nancial institutions, and government emergency measures. After Von Hagen and Ho (2007) , we refer to this approach of dating banking crisis episodes as the event-based approach. 3 This approach identi…es crises only when they 1 Matutes and Vives found that deposit insurance has ambiguous welfare e¤ects in a framework where the market structure of the banking industry is endogenous. 2 See Tchana Tchana (2008) for a complete review of empirical studies on the link between regulation and Banking Stability. 3 On this issue of selection bias see von- Hagen and Ho (2007) .
are severe enough to trigger market events. In contrast, crises successfully contained by corrective policies are neglected. Hence, empirical work based on the event-based approach su¤ers from a selection bias.
The …rst goal of this paper is to deal with this selection bias problem by using an alternative estimation method, the Markov-switching regression model (MSM), to assess the e¤ect of various types of banking regulation on banking system stability. 4 The second goal is to assess the e¤ect of these regulations on crisis duration.
To achieve these goals, we …rst compute an index of banking system fragility and use it as the dependent variable to estimate the probability of banking crises. Secondly, we implement a three-state Markov-switching model, where the three states are: the systemic crisis state, the tranquil state, and the booming state. We introduce regulatory measures as explanatory variables of the probability of transition from one state to another to assess their e¤ect on the occurrence of a systemic banking crisis. We will refer to this method as the Time-Varying Probability of Transition Markov-Switching Model, hereafter TVPT-MSM.
We derive from the TVPT-MSM the marginal e¤ect of each regulatory measure on the probability of being in the systemic banking crisis state. Thirdly, we use this speci…cation to assess the e¤ect of regulatory measures on banking crisis duration. Fourthly, we carry out a sensitivity analysis: we …rst use an alternative index to see if the results are robust;
we also use a Monte Carlo procedure to check the sensitivity of the results to having less than two states and to having state-dependent standard deviations. Finally, we assess the importance of selection bias resolved by the TVPT-MSM.
We applied our methodology to an emerging market economy, Indonesia, which has su¤ered from banking crises during the period 1980-2003, and where there have been some dynamics on the regulatory measures during the same period. We focus our analysis on four major regulatory measures: (i) entry restriction; the removal of entry restriction is assumed by many authors such as Allen and Herring (2001) to have contributed to the reappearance of systemic banking crisis; (ii) deposit insurance, which is supposed to reduce instability by providing liquidity, therefore reducing the possibility of bank runs. However, it has been found by many authors to increase the moral hazard problem in the banking industry;
(iii) reserve requirements, which most economists viewed as a tax on the banking system that can lead to greater instability in the banking system; and (iv) the capital adequacy requirement, which is promoted by the Basel Accords and is supposed to be e¤ective in reducing the probability of a banking crisis.
We …nd that reducing entry restriction increases the duration of a crisis and the probability of being in the banking crisis state. The reserve requirement reduces crisis duration but seems to increase banking fragility. Deposit insurance increases the stability of the Indonesian banking system and reduces the duration of banking crises. The capital adequacy requirement improves stability and reduces the expected duration of banking crises. This later result is obtained when we control for the level of entry barrier.
Our paper builds on the previous literature of banking crisis indices and the Markovswitching regression. The paper most closely related to ours is by Ho (2004) , who also applied the MSM to the research on banking crises. It uses a basic two-state Markovswitching model to detect episodes of banking crises. However, his paper does not apply the MSM framework to study the e¤ect of banking regulations on the banking system stability, which is the main feature we are interested in. The papers by Hawkins and Klau (2000) , Kibritçioglu (2003) , and Von- Hagen and Ho (2007) are related in that they build banking system fragility indices, and use them to identify episodes of a banking crisis. 5 The objective of this method is to construct an index that can re ‡ect the vulnerability or the fragility of the banking system (i.e., periods in which the index exceeds a given threshold are de…ned as banking crisis episodes).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the TVPT-MSM and its estimation strategy. Section 3 analyzes the Indonesian banking system. Section 4 assesses empirically the e¤ect of banking regulations on the occurrence and the duration of banking crises. Section 5 carries out a sensitivity analysis. Section 6 assesses the selection bias. We conclude in section 7.
The Model and the Estimation Strategy
To estimate a Markov-switching model we need an indicator that we will use to assess the state of the banking activity. Therefore, in this section, we …rst present an index of banking system fragility, before presenting the TVPT-MSM.
The Banking System Fragility Index
The idea behind the banking system fragility index (hereafter BSF I), introduced by Kibritçioglu (2003) , is that all banks are potentially exposed to three major types of economic and …nancial risk: (i) liquidity risk (i.e., bank runs), (ii) credit risk (i.e., rising of nonperforming loans), and (iii) exchange-rate risk (i.e., bank's increasing unhedged foreign currency liabilities). 6 The BSF I uses the bank deposit growth as a proxy for liquidity risk, the bank credit to the domestic private sector growth as a proxy for credit risk, and the bank foreign liabilities growth as a proxy for exchange-rate risk. Formally, the BSF I is computed as follows:
N CP S t = CP S t cps cps while CP S t = LCP S t LCP S t 12 LCP S t 12 ; and (3)
where (:) and (:) stand for the arithmetic average and for the standard deviation of these three variables, respectively. LCP S t denotes the banking system's total real claims on the private sector; LF L t denotes the bank's total real foreign liabilities; and LDEP t denotes the total deposits of banks. One should notice that nominal series are de ‡ated by using the corresponding domestic consumer price index.
The Markov-Switching Model
In this subsection we present and provide the estimation method of our econometric model.
The Model Setup
We adapt the Garcia and Perron (1996) MSM to assess the state of the banking activity.
To ease the presentation, we present only the model with three states (which happen to be more appropriate for our data), although we have studied the other speci…cations. These three states are : (i) the systemic crisis state with a mean 1 and variance 2 1 ; (ii) the tranquil state with a mean 2 and variance 2 2 ; and (iii) the booming state with a mean 3 and a variance 2 3 . 7 Let y be a banking system fragility index (as provided in the above subsection). We assume that the index's dynamics are only determined by its mean and its variance. We set up the model as follows:
6 Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache and Gupta (2006) have found in a panel of countries, which have su¤ered from systemic banking crises during the last two decades, that in crises years, one observes an important decrease in the growth rate of banks' deposits and of credit to the private sector. 7 
We assess the e¤ect of regulations on banking crises by assuming that the transition probability from one state to another is a¤ected by regulatory measures taken by the government such as the entry barrier, the reserve requirement, the deposit insurance, and the capital adequacy requirement. 8 Formally, we assume that for i = 1; 2; 3 and all t,
for j = 1; 2; while,
Note that the model speci…cation with constant probability of transition is a special case of the above model where Z t is the null matrix.
This model is well suited to account for selection bias since it uses a measure of banking system activity more robust to prompt and corrective action, and also because the Markov-switching model is an endogenous regime switching model that, according to Maddala (1986), is a good framework for a self-selection model. The T V P T M SM is also suitable to account for endogeneity bias since the states of nature and the e¤ect of regulation on the occurrence of these states are jointly estimated. In other words, the T V P T M SM is a type of a simultaneous equations models.
The Estimation Method for the TVPT-MSM
We jointly estimate the parameters in equation (5) and the transition probability parameters in equation (7) by maximum likelihood. 9 For this purpose, we …rst derive the likelihood of the model. The conditional joint-density distribution, f , summarizes the information in the data and links explicitly the transition probabilities to the estimation method.
If the sequence of states fs t g from 0 to T were known, it would be possible to write the joint conditional log likelihood function of the sequence fy t g as ln [f (y T ; :::; y 0 js T ; :::; s 0 ; Z T ; :::
Since s t is not observed, but only y t from time 0 to T , we adapt the two-step method of Kim and Nelson (1999) to determine the log likelihood function. (See details in appendix A).
Estimating the Marginal E¤ect of Regulation on Banking Stability
When the regulatory measures are included in the probability of transition, the result obtained from the standard Markov-switching estimation is the estimated value of the parameters de…ning the transition probabilities. Since many parameters are involved in the computation of these probabilities of transition, the direct estimates of these parameters do not tell us the full story about the e¤ect of each regulatory measure on the transition probability. More importantly, it does not provide an assessment of each regulatory variable on the probability of the banking system being in a given state. In other words, to obtain the e¤ect of a regulatory measure (z l ) on the banking stability one should compute the marginal e¤ect of each regulation on the probability of the banking system being in the systemic crisis state. We derive the result in the proposition below, but …rst present a lemma that will help in the derivation.
Lemma Let z lt be a time series variable, if z lt is a continuous variable, the marginal e¤ect of z lt on p ij;t for i = 1; 2; 3 is given by:
; (10) for j = 1; 2; and;
Let z lt be a dummy variable, the marginal e¤ect of z lt on p ij;t is given by
where z lt is the matrix Z t without z lt :
Proof These results are straightforward from a partial di¤erentiation of (7) and (8) . See details in appendix A.
Proposition The marginal e¤ect of any exogenous continuous time series variable z lt on the probability of the banking system to be in state s t = 1 is given by:
The marginal e¤ect of any exogenous dummy variable z lt on the probability of the banking system to be in state s t = 1 is given by:
Proof The idea of this proof is to compute the unconditional probability of state s t = 1, and then derive it with respect to z lt . Details are available in appendix A.
We know that a given continuous variable z k has a positive e¤ect on the banking system stabilization if it has a positive e¤ect on P r(s t = 1). i.e., at any time t; @P r(st=1) @z kt 0: Using the above proposition, this is achieved when for all i i1;k 0, and i1;k i2;k :
In other words, the regulatory measure (z k ) increases the probability of the banking system to get into a systemic banking crisis when (15) 
the regulatory measure (z k ) reduces the probability of the banking system to su¤er a systemic banking crisis.
The other combinations of parameters are di¢cult to handle analytically, but fortunately with the above proposition we can compute the marginal e¤ect of each explanatory variable at its mean. To do this we follow the literature of the discrete variable model, which computes the marginal e¤ect at the mean of the explanatory variable.We then use the delta method to compute the standard error of this marginal e¤ect.
E¤ect of Regulation on Banking Crisis Duration
A heuristic idea of the e¤ect of a regulatory measure (z k ) on the crisis duration is given by the sign of 
It follows that the regulatory measure z k reduces the probability of remaining in state 1, (
i.e., remaining in the banking crisis state) if condition (17) is met. This can be viewed as a positive e¤ect on the banking crisis duration.
However, to assess properly the expected duration of a given state j, at each time t, we keep in mind that the adoption of any type of regulation is assumed to be exogenous and that its adoption is not predictable. We will then consider that the expected duration at a given point in time is based on the transition probability observed at that time. More precisely, the expected duration of a given state j, at time t, conditional on the inferred state (crisis state, tranquil state or booming state, respectively) is given by:
Since for all i
the expected duration is similar to the case of absence of constant probability of transition.
In fact, substituting (20) in (19) yields
The Data
We now apply our estimation strategy to the Indonesian banking system. We will …rst present the background of the banking activity in Indonesia during the period 1980-2003, before describing the data used in our empirical investigation.
The Background of the Indonesian Banking System
The Indonesian banking system has experienced some important structural developments 
Data Sources
Before proceeding let us recall that the index of banking system fragility is given by
where Figure 1 shows the BSF I index for Indonesia. It presents three phases: a phase with higher index value consisting of two periods (1988-1990, and 1996-1997) , a phase with the index value around zero over two periods (1980-1987, and 1991-1996) , and a phase with lower index value for one period (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) .
Banking System Fragility Index
[
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
The two higher value periods are driven by di¤erent causes. The 1988-1997 period was a consequence of the introduction of the …rst major package of removal of entry restrictions.
In fact, in October 1988, the government introduced a new legislation that allowed the private sector to create and manage banks. This legislation stimulated the banking activity through the credit channel, since newly created banks provided new loans to the private sector, which in turn translated into new deposits. The Indonesian banking system took approximately two years to return to the normal trend in its activities. By contrast, the 1996-1997 period was driven by an increase of credit to the private sector due to an increase of foreign capital in the Indonesian banking system. It was also a consequence of the 1994 regulation removing the ceiling on the maximum share of investment a foreign investor can withdraw, and also the 1996 regulation allowing mutual funds to be 100 percent foreignowned.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
The two medium-value periods are periods with smooth dynamics in the banking activity. In those periods there is no important change in regulation, nor in the banking system structure. 
Results
The econometric methods assess the degree to which T V P T M SM characterize banking crises, and assess the impact of regulatory measures. The …rst panel of table 1 presents the mean, and the following panels present the e¤ect of regulatory measures on the probability of the banking system to be in a given state.
Column (1) presents the estimated parameters without regulation, column (2) the estimates of speci…cation with entry restriction, column (3) the estimates with reserve requirement, column (4) the estimates with deposit insurance, column (5) the estimates with capital adequacy requirement, column (6) the estimates with deposit insurance and reserve requirement, column (7) the estimates with entry restriction and capital adequacy requirement, and …nally column (8) presents the estimates of the speci…cation with all these regulatory variables.
We obtain that all three states are signi…cantly di¤erent from one another, since the con…dence intervals at 95 percent on their means do not coincide. Also we obtain that the mean of the crisis state is negative, while the mean of the tranquil state is around 0 and the mean of the booming state is strictly positive, suggesting that the states are in fact representing periods of contraction, normal activity, and expansion in the banking sector.
Furthermore, the mean of the crisis state is close to 0:86 and its variance is 0:22; a signi…cantly larger number than the estimated variance in the tranquil state. The MSM succeeded in capturing the fact that in July 1997 the Indonesian banking system was in a state of crisis. As we explained in section 3 describing the Indonesian banking system, the banking crisis which started in the second semester of 1997 was characterized by a huge decrease in the growth of credit to the private sector, banking deposits, and foreign liabilities.
Besides, the estimated mean of the tranquil state is around 0:11 for each of our estimations, which is an indication that during the tranquil period, the weighted average of growth rates of credit to private sector, banking deposits and foreign liabilities was slightly positive. In other words, the tranquil period is characterized by a slight positive growth rate in banking activity. Its estimated variance of 0:07 is lower than the variance in the other states. This was expected as tranquil states tend to be periods of less volatility; generally, there are periods of business as usual, i.e., no external shocks nor changes in the banking industry.
Finally, the estimated mean of the booming state is around 1:9 with a variance of 0:7.
This value is high compared to the expected maximum value of 3 at a 99 percent con…dence level. It means also that in booming periods the weighted average of credit to the private sector, banking deposits, and foreign liabilities grows very fast. In fact, the two periods of fast growth of the Indonesian banking sector were characterized by sudden and very high increase of banking deposits and credit to the private sector.
Impact of Regulation on Banking Stability [INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
Entry Restriction: The estimated parameters provided in Table 1 do not verify neither condition (15) nor condition (16) . Hence, the only way to assess the impact of entry restriction on stability is by using the marginal e¤ect results developed in section 2. Table   2 shows that this marginal e¤ect is estimated at -0:111 and it is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, i.e., entry restriction reduced the fragility of the Indonesian banking system. In fact, the crisis of 1997 was preceded by a period of removal of entry restriction. Speci…cally, in 1994 a regulatory bill allowed foreign investors to withdraw without limit their deposits in the banking system, and in 1996 Indonesian regulation allowed mutual funds to be 100 percent owned by foreigners. When we control for the level of capital requirement the result remains unchanged. This supports the view of Allen and Herring (2001) that entry restriction is associated with banking instability. More precisely, Allen and Herring link the re-appearance of systemic banking crisis in the 1980s to the reduction and/or removal of entry restriction in many banking systems. 12 Reserve Requirement: Like for entry restriction, the estimated parameters do not satisfy the conditions derived from the proposition. We then refer to Table 2 ; where the marginal e¤ect of an increase in the reserve requirement level on the probability of the banking system to be in the systemic crisis state is computed. The estimated coe¢cient is 0:135 and it is signi…cant at the 10 percent level. In other words, an increase in the reserve requirement by 1 point reduces the probability of being in the crisis state by 0:135 point. This does not come as a surprise since during the period 1984 1998 the level of the reserve requirement in Indonesia was very low, at 2 percent. It was increased in 1998 to 5 percent as the aftermath of the 1997 systemic banking crisis. It was also raised at a time when the government was putting in place its explicit and universal deposit insurance.
This may not be a coincidence, since the deposit insurance regulation literature emphasizes the need of reserve requirement to reduce the moral hazard problem associated with the existence of an explicit deposit guarantee. 13 It is then important to control for this. When 1 2 This also conforms with an earlier empirical work of Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), which found a positive link between less entry restriction in the banking activity and banking fragility. 1 3 See e.g., Bryant (1980) for a theoretical rationale.
we control for the existence of an explicit guarantee for banking deposits, we observe that the sign of this elasticity is di¤erent. The elasticity is now positive and equal to 0:155 and it is signi…cant at the one percent level. In other words, when we control for the existence of deposit insurance, the reserve requirement is actually positively associated with banking instability.
This second result is more appropriate. In fact, the …rst estimation can be viewed as an estimation with an omitted variable, which means that the parameters estimated in this context are biased and inconsistent. Finally, we do not worry about multicollinearity as the coe¢cient of correlation between deposit insurance and reserve requirement is small ( 0:11).
Deposit Insurance: Table 2 shows that the marginal e¤ect of deposit insurance on the probability of the Indonesian banking system to be in a crisis is equal to 0:033, i.e., the introduction of deposit insurance reduces instability. When we control for the level of reserve requirement the result becomes even stronger. The new elasticity is 0:043 and it is signi…cant at a 5 percent level. In other words, the Diamond and Dydvig (1983) view on the e¤ect of deposit insurance for stabilization purposes seems to …nd supporting evidence here. It is then the converse of the empirical result of Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) who found that the moral hazard e¤ect of deposit insurance is dominant. Like in the previous paragraph, the second speci…cation is more appropriate.
Capital Adequacy Requirement: The estimated parameters for the capital adequacy requirement in the TVPT-MSM speci…cation do not satisfy any of the su¢cient conditions (15) and (16); hence we should refer to Table 2 . It shows that the marginal effect of the capital adequacy requirement is equal to 0:198 but it is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. Therefore, without control it has no impact on Indonesian banking stability.
But we know that capital adequacy requirement was introduced in Indonesia following the removal of entry restriction on domestic private investors in 1988. When we control for the level of entry restriction, we obtain that instead the capital adequacy requirement has reduced the probability to be in the banking crisis state by 0:033 and it is signi…cant at 5 percent. 14 There is, however, a negative correlation between entry restriction and the other regulatory measures that we have studied. This correlation is close to 0:48 for reserve requirement, 0:55 for deposit insurance, and 0:67 for capital adequacy requirement. This can be a source of multicollinearity. However, we have controlled for multicollinearity by dropping 2:5 percent, and 5 percent of the sample data, and we have found that the result remained almost the same. Therefore, we concluded that multicollinearity was not an important issue.
Expected Duration
Another goal of this paper is to study the expected duration of the systemic crisis state. The three-state MSM with constant probabilities of transition shows that the expected duration of banking crises is equal to 42 months. As we can see in Figure 4 , the expected duration is a¤ected by banking regulations. More precisely, the presence of deposit insurance tends to reduce crisis duration. An increase of the capital adequacy requirement tends also to reduce crisis duration. An increase in the reserve requirement reduces crisis duration, while entry restriction increases crisis duration. 15 [INSERT FIGURE 3 and OLS regression the e¤ect of each regulation on the stability of the banking system. We will refer to this method as the M SM OLS regression. 16 In Table 4 , we report the results obtained from the M SM OLS regression.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
Deposit insurance appears to have a positive and signi…cant e¤ect on the probability of the banking system to be in the systemic crisis period. When we control for other regulatory measures, this e¤ect is equal to 0:82; with macroeconomic variables the new number is 0:81.
The e¤ect of a reserve requirement, when we control with the entire set of major regulatory variables, is equal to 0:95 and is 0:81 when we add key macroeconomic variables. The capital adequacy requirement has a negative and signi…cant e¤ect on the probability of the banking system to be in the crisis state. In fact, when we control with the other regulatory variables, this e¤ect is equal to 0:78; while it is equal to 0:32 when we control with other macroeconomic variables. Finally, the e¤ect of entry restriction is signi…cant and negative even when we control with other regulatory measures.
Let us now assess the di¤erence between the two methods. Deposit insurance increases the probability of being in a crisis in the M SM OLS regression but not in the T V P T M SM . This di¤erence can be explained by the fact that deposit insurance was put in place in 1998; a crisis year. Therefore, the M SM OLS perceives a positive correlation between its presence and the occurrence of the banking crisis even though the crisis preceded it. The M SM OLS shows a higher impact of the capital adequacy requirement for stabilization purposes than the T V P T M SM . A rationale behind this is that just after the beginning of the banking crisis in 1997, the Indonesian government has reduced the rate of its capital adequacy requirement and then started to increase it slowly. Hence, the M SM OLS perceives a stronger link between the reduction of the capital adequacy requirement and the presence of banking crises. The result on entry restriction is not too di¤erent. In the T V P T M SM; reserve requirements have a less positive impact on banking stability than in the M SM OLS. More generally, the marginal e¤ects produced by the T V P T M SM tend to be less important in magnitude.
Robustness
In this section, we verify the robustness of our results. First, we assess the impact of banking regulation using another index of banking crisis, and then we verify whether we used the appropriate number of states.
Sensitivity to the Index
In the BSFI, each type of risk is weighted equally. This can be a source of misidenti…cation as it tends to give each type of risk the same importance in causing banking crises. We modify the BSF I to take into account this issue and we rename the new index as the banking system crisis index (hereafter the BSCI). We use the weighting procedure of the monetary condition index (M CI) literature (see, e.g., Duguay (1994) , and Lin (1999)), but instead of running a free regression we estimate a constrained regression. More precisely, we assume that a banking crisis can be determined by a number of macroeconomic and …nancial variables: economic growth (hereafter Gy t ), interest rate changes (hereafter Gr t ), variation in the banking reserves ratio (hereafter G t ), exchange rate ‡uctuations (hereafter Ge t ), growth of the credit to the private sector, rate of growth of bank deposits and growth of foreign liabilities.
The new weights w c ; w d ; and w f for the credit to the private sector, the banks' deposits, and the foreign liability respectively, are obtained using a constrained ordered logit model.
In each period the country is either experiencing a systemic banking crisis, a small banking crisis or no crisis. Accordingly, our dependent variable takes the value 2 if there is no crisis, 1 if there is a small crisis and 0 if there is a systemic banking crisis. The probability that a crisis occurs at a given time t is assumed to be a function of a vector of n explanatory variables X t . Let P t denote a variable that takes the value of 0 when a banking crisis occurs, 1 if a minor banking crisis occurs and 2 when there is no banking crisis at time t. 17 is a vector of n unknown coe¢cients and F ( 0 X t ) is the cumulative probability distribution function taken at 0 X t : The log-likelihood function of the model is given by
where I it = 1 if P t = i; 0 if not; for i = 0; 1; 2; and where X t represents the matrix of all exogenous variables, N the number of countries, T the number of years in the sample and C a threshold value. We assume here that
and that there exist three real numbers a; b; c; such that The BSCI index is then computed as:
To obtain the index with the Indonesian data, we complete our previous dataset so as to be able to compute Gy; Gr; G and Ge. 18 The variable for banking crises is obtained from Caprio et al. (2003) . For Indonesia the estimate of the reduced form model presented 1 7 Although this variable does not provide the crisis date with certainty, we assume that it contains su¢cient information to help us compute the weight of each type of risk in introducing banking crisis. 1 8 To compute Ge we use the data on exchange rate available from IFS's line AF . To compute Gr we use the nominal interest rate from IFS's line 60B. To compute Gy we use the information on the real GDP growth available in the World Development Indicator (WDI) 2006. To compute G we use the demand deposits from (IFS line 24) , the time and saving deposits (IFS line 25), the foreign liabilities (IFS line 26C) of deposit money banks and the credit from monetary authorities (IFS line 26G).
in (22) The student t statistics are in parentheses. We obtain from the above estimation that w c = 0:8049; w d = 0:195; and w f = 7:04E 08: We observe that the weight for the credit to the private sector is greater than the weight of bank deposits. More importantly, the weight for foreign liability is practically zero. This may be due to the fact that the Indonesian banking crisis was introduced by non-performing loans. In fact, in mid-1997 most domestic …rms could not service their liabilities to international and domestic banks. 19 This later translated into a severe liquidity problem arising from increased burdens of …rms servicing external debts, and was exacerbated by mass withdrawal of deposits.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] Figure 4 presents the new index. We observe that the graph of the BSCI is similar to the graph of the BSF I. We can then guess that we should obtain the same results.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] Table 5 provides the raw parameters while Table 6 provides the marginal e¤ect of each regulatory measure on the probability of the banking system to go into crisis. We observe that the results are fundamentally the same for each type of regulation. The results di¤er slightly on the crisis duration. In fact, the expected crisis duration is 42 months for the BSF I index while it is 21 months for the BSCI; but the impact of each type of regulation on the expected duration is exactly the same.
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE]
Sensitivity to the MSM Speci…cation
In this subsection we verify that the three-state speci…cation with di¤erent variances for each state is the appropriate model. We compare this speci…cation with the two-state speci…cation and with the three-state speci…cation but with constant variance. 
We generate this index randomly one thousand times, and follow this procedure the same number of times to obtain the empirical distribution of the test statistic. In Table 7 we report the critical values of these test statistics.
[INSERT Table   7 . It follows that on the basis of this test the three-state speci…cation should be chosen instead of the two-state. The same result holds with the BSCI index.
Assessing the Selection Bias
We now assess the selection bias in the existing work. For this purpose we compare our estimates to estimates obtained with the logit method used in the previous literature. Since the previous works were conducted mostly with cross-country data, we …rst develop another discrete regression model to have speci…c coe¢cients on Indonesia.
The Ordered Logit Model (OLM)
We estimate the probability of a banking crisis using an ordered logit model. In each period the country is either experiencing a systemic banking crisis, a small banking crisis or no crisis. Accordingly, our dependent variable takes the value 2 if there is no crisis, 1 if there is a small crisis and 0 if there is a systemic banking crisis.
The probability that a crisis occurs at a given time t is assumed to be a function of a vector of n explanatory variables X t . Let P t denote a variable that takes the value of 0 when a banking crisis occurs, 1 when a minor banking crisis occurs and 2 when no banking crisis occurs at time t. is a vector of n unknown coe¢cients and F ( 0 X t ) is the cumulative probability distribution function taken at 0 X t : The log-likelihood function of the model is given by
where I it = 1 if P t = i; 0 if not; for i = 0; 1; 2; and where X t represents the matrix of all exogenous variables, N the number of countries, T the number of years in the sample and C a threshold value. We then use the estimated parameters to compute the marginal e¤ect of each regulatory measure on the probability of the banking system to be in a systemic crisis.
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE]
In Table 9 we report the results using the ordered logit model. We observe that deposit insurance appears to have a positive and signi…cant marginal e¤ect on the probability for the banking system to be in the systemic crisis period. When we control with other regulatory measures, this marginal e¤ect is equal to 0:69. The reserve requirement has no marginal signi…cant e¤ect on the probability of the banking system to be in the systemic crisis period.
The marginal e¤ect of the capital adequacy requirement is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero when we control for other regulatory measures. Finally, the marginal e¤ect of entry restriction is signi…cant and negative even when we control for the existence of capital adequacy requirement. Table 10 shows that previous works link deposit insurance to instability. We found that in the Indonesian case if we used the OLM or the M SM OLS we still have the same result.
Results of the Previous Work
But the result is di¤erent if we use the T V P T M SM . In the later case deposit insurance improves banking stability. Hence, the selection bias is not the only issue to deal with. This suggests that the simultaneity bias due to the adoption of full deposit insurance during the crisis is better taken into account by the T V P T M SM than by the other models.
Previous studies found a non-signi…cant link between the capital requirement and banking fragility. 21 But, with Indonesia, we obtain a signi…cant negative link at 10 percent.
When we used the OLM; the link is also signi…cant and negative, but lower than the coe¢cient of the event-based method. We can then infer a negative selection bias. But even here the magnitude of the T V P T M SM coe¢cient is signi…cantly di¤erent from the M SM OLS coe¢cient. We guess that this is due to the simultaneity bias. In fact, the Indonesian government reduced the level of the capital adequacy requirement during the crisis and started to increase it as the situation was improving. The T V P T M SM is more able to take this feature into account.
Entry restriction has been linked to stability by the previous studies. We obtain the same result here and no signi…cant bias.
Concerning the reserve requirement, studies using event-based data found mixed results on the link between it and instability. This is not the case with the M SM OLS. Instead, we found a positive and signi…cant link between higher reserve requirement and instability. Therefore, the selection bias is positive. As in the previous case we found that the simultaneity bias is also important.
[INSERT 
Conclusion
The …rst goal of this research was to provide an estimation strategy that was less subject to selection bias and to use it to assess empirically the e¤ect of banking regulations on the banking system stability. The second goal was to assess the e¤ect of each type of regulation on crisis duration. To this end, we developed a three-state Markov-switching regression model. Speci…cally, we introduced four major regulations (entry restriction, deposit insurance, reserve requirement, and capital adequacy requirement) as explanatory variables of the probability of transition of one state to another in order to assess the e¤ect of these regulations on the occurrence and the duration of systemic banking crises.
Given that the time-varying probability of transition TVPT-MSM does not provide a straightforward measure of the marginal e¤ect of exogenous variables on the probability of the system to be in a given state, we derived analytically the marginal e¤ect of each exogenous variable on the probability of the system to be in a given state. This is our theoretical contribution to the MSM literature. We then applied our strategy to the Indonesian banking system, which has su¤ered from systemic banking crises during the last two decades and where there has been some dynamics on the regulatory measures during the same period.
We found that: (i) entry restriction reduces crisis duration and the probability of being in the crisis state. This result is consistent with other results available in the banking crisis literature linking banking crises and an easing in entry restrictions; (ii) reserve requirements increase banking fragility; but this result is obtained only when we take into account the existence of deposit insurance. At the same time reserve requirements tend to reduce banking crisis duration; (iii) the deposit insurance increases the stability of the Indonesian banking system and reduces the banking crisis duration. This result is di¤erent from the Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) result about the link between the existence of explicit deposit insurance and banking fragility, and it raises a ‡ag about the importance of the simultaneity bias in this type of studies; (iv) the capital adequacy requirement improves stability and reduces the expected duration of a banking crisis; this result is obtained when we control for the level of entry restrictions.
We have also provided an idea of the selection bias present in the previous literature.
We found that studies using the event-based method present a positive selection bias on deposit insurance and reserve requirements, a negative selection bias on capital adequacy requirement but no selection bias on entry restriction.
It then appears that the T V P T M SM can improve our understanding of the impact of regulation on banking activities by allowing us to work on a given country, taking into account the selection bias as well as the simultaneity bias. In fact, in the T V P T M SM;
the states of nature and the e¤ect of regulation on the occurrence of each state are jointly estimated. In other words, the T V P T M SM is a type of a simultaneous equation model.
Finally, it helps to provide an assessment of the impact of regulatory measures on the expected duration of crises. However, it presents an important limitation. It is less tractable when the number of exogenous variables explaining the probability of transition is important. In fact, in a three-state T V P T M SM the introduction of an additional variable leads to the estimation of six new parameters. This makes the convergence of the maximum likelihood estimation technique more di¢cult to achieve and complicates the estimation process.
Appendix 8.1 Appendix A Application of the Kim and Nelson Method on the TVPT-MSM
Let us set t = f t 1 ; y t ; Z t g:
Step 1. We consider the joint density of y t and the unobserved s t variable, which is the product of the conditional and marginal densities: f (y t ; s t j t 1 ) = f (y t js t ; t 1 )f (s t j t 1 ):
Step 2. To obtain the marginal density of y t , we integrate the s t variable out of the above joint density by summing over all possible values of s t :
The log likelihood function is then given by
The marginal density given above can be interpreted as a weighted average of the conditional densities given s t = 1; s t = 2, and s t = 3; respectively.
We adopt the following …lter for the calculation of the weighting terms :
Step 1. Given P r[s t 1 = ij t 1 ]; i = 1; 2; 3, at the beginning of time t or the t th iteration, the weighting terms P r[s t = jj t 1 ]; j = 1; 2; 3 are calculated as
where P r[s t = jjs t 1 = i; Z t 1 ]; i = 1; 2; 3; j = 1; 2; 3 are the transition probabilities.
Step 2. Once y t is observed at the end on time t, or at the end of the t th iteration, we update the probability term as follows:
The above two steps may be iterated to get P r[s t = jj t ]; t = 1; 2; :::; T . To start the above …lter at time t = 1, however, we need P r[s 0 j 0 ]. We can employ the method of Kim and Nelson to obtain the steady-state or unconditional probabilities
Proof of the Lemma
Let z lt be a time series variable. Let us set
With this notation for i = 1; 2; 3;
for j = 1; 2; and
If z lt is a continuous variable, its marginal e¤ect on p ij;t can be computed as:
Besides, direct derivation of (26) in respect with z lt yields,
Substituting (29) in (28) yields
Developing and regrouping the right hand side of equation (30) gives
Let us now compute @p i3;t @z lt for i = 1; 2; 3: A direct di¤erentiation of (27) yields
Substituting (29) in (31) yields
For dummy variable taking the value 1 or 0, the marginal e¤ect is obtained by computing p ij;t = [p ij;t (z lt ; 1) p ij;t (z lt ; 0)] ; where z lt is the matrix Z t without z lt :
Proof of the Proposition
We know that t = P t t 1 , and since t 2 4 P r(s t = 1) P r(s t = 2) P r(s t = 3)
it follows that we can rewrite it as 2 4 P r(s t = 1) P r(s t = 2) P r(s t = 3) P r(s t 1 = 1) P r(s t 1 = 2) P r(s t 1 = 3)
This implies that P r(s t = 1) = p 11;t P r(s t 1 = 1) + p 21;t P r(s t 1 = 2) + p 31;t P r(s t 1 = 3) (33) P r(s t = 2) = p 12;t P r(s t 1 = 1) + p 22;t P r(s t 1 = 2) + p 32;t P r(s t 1 = 3) (34) P r(s t = 3) = p 13;t P r(s t 1 = 1) + p 23;t P r(s t 1 = 2) + p 33;t P r(s t 1 = 3): (35)
They can be regrouped in the following general form
It is obvious that P r(s t 1 = i) is not a function of z lt : Hence, if z lt is a continuous
Substituting (10) or (11) in equation (36) gives
; and
More precisely,
And if z lt is a dummy variable, its marginal e¤ect on the probability of being in a given state j is given by
More precisely, Standard deviation in parentheses; * mean signi…cant at ten percent, ** signi…cant at …ve percent, and *** signi…cant at one percent.
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L is the value of the log likelihood function. Standard deviation in parentheses;* mean signi…cant at ten percent, ** signi…cant at …ve percent, and *** signi…cant at one percent. Standard deviation in parentheses; * mean signi…cant at ten percent, ** signi…cant at …ve percent, and *** signi…cant at one percent.
(a) means that we computed the di¤erence of moving from the absence of deposit insurance to its presence. l Standard deviation in parentheses; * mean signi…cant at ten percent, ** signi…cant at …ve percent, and *** signi…cant at one percent. Standard deviation in parentheses; * mean signi…cant at ten percent, ** signi…cant at …ve percent, and *** signi…cant at one percent.
L is the value of the log likelihood function. Standard deviation in parentheses; * mean signi…cant at ten percent, ** signi…cant at …ve percent, and *** signi…cant at one percent. Standard deviation in parentheses; * mean signi…cant at ten percent, ** signi…cant at …ve percent, and *** signi…cant at one percent.
/a means that we computed the di¤erence of moving from no regulation to regulation /a means that we computed the di¤erence on moving from non regulation to regulation Standard deviation in parentheses;* mean signi…cant at ten percent, ** signi…cant at …ve percent, and *** signi…cant at one percent. 
